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Abstract 
The present study investigated the effect of framing and legal 
role on the propensity to settle by litigants in simulated legal 
disputes. Participants were given four different scenarios 
which factorially combined legal role, plaintiff vs. defendant, 
and frame, positive or gain vs. negative or loss. Participants 
also indicated their subjective probability of winning. The 
results indicated that positively framed litigants were more 
willing to settle than negatively framed litigants. Furthermore, 
this analysis revealed that the propensity to settle was a joint 
function of frame and the perceived chance of winning, with 
no systematic effect of legal role. Accordingly, we suggest 
that framing manipulations may be able to influence the rate 
of negotiated settlements of legal disputes. 
Keywords: Prospect theory; framing; legal decision making; 
negotiation; role; plaintiff; defendant 
Introduction 
Negotiation is increasingly viewed as the preferred means of 
resolving disputes in crisis situations, including legal and 
non-legal disputes. The term ‘crisis’ here refers to conflict 
between two or more parties, where the parties must deal with 
each other, and where failure to negotiate a resolution will 
result in a risky and uncertain outcome. Litigation is therefore 
a primary example of this form of conflict. In a civil dispute, 
consisting of a plaintiff and a defendant, the plaintiff can 
(usually) only choose to sue one defendant, and similarly the 
defendant cannot choose not to be sued. The parties therefore 
must deal with each other. This distinguishes a crisis situation 
from other forms of negotiation, such as buyer/seller 
negotiations, where parties can choose to buy or sell 
elsewhere. Furthermore, in litigation, if parties fail to 
negotiate a settlement, the resolution of the dispute will be 
determined by a third party (a judge or jury) at a trial, where 
the outcome is risky and uncertain for both parties. This is in 
contrast to other forms of negotiation, where a failure to 
negotiate simply results in impasse and an end to 
negotiations. Apart from litigation, other types of crisis 
situations include inter-state conflict, hostage negotiation and 
some types of workplace industrial action. 
Failure to resolve crisis situations through negotiations 
can have catastrophic consequences. In the case of 
litigation, civil trials have a major impact not only on the 
individual, in terms of financial and emotional strain, but 
also on society and the economy as a whole. For example, 
1992 report suggested that litigation cost the US economy 
$300 billion per year, a figure which is rising by 12% 
annually (Luu, 1993). Furthermore, recent figures suggest 
that nearly 90% of US businesses are involved in litigation, 
with corporations engaged in an average of 37 lawsuits at 
any one time (Insurance Journal, 2005).  
In light of this, there is considerable value in investigating 
how people evaluate outcomes and make decisions in crisis 
situations, using litigation as a framework. Early research 
attempted to explain litigant behavior through economic 
models of expected utility (Hogarth, 1987; Rachlinski, 
1996), a theoretical orientation favored by at least some 
legal practitioners. For example, in 2000, the US Federal 
Court Judge, Randall Rader, stated his belief that a litigant 
will determine the value of a lawsuit by multiplying the 
probability of winning in court by the amount they are likely 
to win, and then subtracting the legal costs.  Based on this 
calculation, a settlement offer will be accepted if it is higher 
than the expected value of the trial. On this view, 
negotiations fail due to differing estimates by plaintiffs and 
defendants of the probability of winning at trial. 
 
Cognitive processes in dispute negotiation 
The problem with Judge Rader’s approach is that economic 
utility models disregard the cognitive processes involved in 
decision making, and in doing so fail to adequately describe 
human behavior. It is for this reason that attention is now 
focused on how an individual represents the facts of the 
dispute, the probabilities of different outcomes, and the 
nature and value of what is at stake.  
Several investigators have attempted to account for failure 
of negotiations in terms of differing representations of 
plaintiffs and defendants (e.g., van Koppen, 1990; Korobkin 
& Guthrie, 1994; Rachlinski, 1996). These studies 
investigated the effect of framing on decision making. The 
concept of framing was introduced by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) as part of their development of prospect 
theory which they offered as an alternative to traditional 
economic utility models. According to prospect theory, 
individuals evaluate outcomes in terms of gains and losses 
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 from a given reference point which, in turn, influences an 
individual’s risk preferences. Decisions made in the context 
of gains are said to be “positively framed” and are generally 
characterized by risk aversion. In contrast, decisions made in 
the context of losses are said to be “negatively framed” and 
are characterized by risk seeking behavior.  
Prospect theory suggests that a positively framed litigant 
will be risk averse, and therefore be more inclined to reach an 
out-of-court settlement (a certain outcome) than their 
negatively framed counterparts. In contrast, a negatively 
framed litigant will be much more willing to risk a trial rather 
than accept a certain outcome in the form of a settlement. The 
challenge for researchers is to identify the conditions under 
which litigants will be either risk seeking or risk averse, and 
whether these conditions can be manipulated to help increase 
the number of negotiated settlements.  
In one of the first studies to examine the effect of frame on 
litigant behavior, van Koppen (1990) proposed that during 
settlement negotiations, plaintiffs will be in a positive frame 
while defendants will be in a negative frame. This, he 
suggested, followed from the fact that a plaintiff typically 
chooses between gains – they must decide whether to accept a 
sum of money or go to trial – while a defendant typically 
chooses between losses – they must decide whether to pay a 
sum of money or go to trial. Van Koppen tested this 
hypothesis by presenting a civil dispute scenario to 
participants in which they adopted the role of either plaintiff 
or defendant. Participants were then asked to nominate a sum 
that they would be prepared to accept (if the plaintiff) or to 
pay (if the defendant) in order to settle out of court. The 
results showed, as expected, that plaintiffs were more risk 
averse than defendants.  
Although van Koppen (1990) showed that plaintiffs are 
more risk averse than defendants, it is not possible to attribute 
this solely to a difference in frame or reference point since, in 
this study, legal role (plaintiff or defendant) and frame 
(positive or negative) were perfectly confounded. Van 
Koppen attempted to eliminate an effect of legal role by 
creating a scenario in which each participant was faced with 
largely equivalent facts. This scenario involved participants 
imagining that they had purchased a new puppy from a 
breeder. Unbeknownst to the purchaser, the puppy has a heart 
defect and dies soon after delivery. Different legal roles were 
created as follows: in the plaintiff version, the purchaser pays 
for the puppy on delivery and subsequently sues the breeder 
for a refund. However, in the defendant version, payment is 
required later. When the puppy dies, the purchaser withholds 
payment, for which breeder then sues. Van Koppen assumed 
that the only relevant difference between the scenarios is the 
question of suing or being sued. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the facts of the case genuinely differ between the two 
versions, and participants may have adopted quite different 
interpretations of the relative merits of each case. 
 
Frame and legal role 
An important caveat is that, though intuitively appealing, 
there is no necessary link between frame and legal role. The 
adoption of a frame depends on the evaluation of outcomes 
in terms of gains and losses from a given reference point 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1983). Therefore it should be 
possible to manipulate how a litigant perceives their 
situation, largely independently of whether they play the 
role of plaintiff or defendant. Consider, for example, a 
company that has purchased a piece of machinery to 
perform a particular task. It is soon discovered that the 
machine contains a manufacturing fault and it ceases to 
function. The manufacturer acknowledges responsibility and 
replaces the machine two weeks after the fault was 
discovered. The company decides to sue the manufacturer 
for income lost during the two weeks it took to replace the 
faulty product. According to van Koppen (1990) the 
company – as the plaintiff in the legal action – will evaluate 
the outcome in terms of potential gains and will thus be in a 
positive frame. This is based on the assumption that the 
company’s reference point is set at the position in which 
they find themselves following the two week hiatus. 
However, it is possible (even likely) that the company 
chooses a reference point based on the position they would 
have been in had the machine not been faulty. This induces 
a negative frame, since anything less than full income 
reimbursement represents a loss.  
Similarly, depending upon where their reference point is 
placed, there is no reason why a defendant may not also 
adopt a positive frame. Consider, for example, the editors of 
a tabloid magazine who decide to print a potentially 
defamatory article and are subsequently sued because of it. 
In the meantime, they have sold a great number of 
additional magazines and have garnered some valuable 
notoriety. If they take the current situation as their reference 
point then the legal action involves a potential loss of 
income and they will be in a negative frame. However, if 
they take as their reference point the situation they would 
have been in had they not chosen to publish the article then 
the current situation would represent a potential gain and 
they would be in a positive frame. 
If it is possible to manipulate frame independently of 
legal role then this may offer a way of helping to resolve 
legal and other disputes. In general, a dispute is settled if the 
maximum offer that the defendant is prepared to make is 
greater than or equal to the minimum price that the plaintiff 
is prepared to accept. In the standard view, the plaintiff is in 
a positive frame and the defendant is in a negative frame, 
which poses difficulties for settlement. While a risk averse 
(positively framed) plaintiff may be willing to make a 
generous offer, a risk seeking (negatively framed) defendant 
is unlikely to accept. From the perspective of promoting 
negotiated settlements, negative frames in either plaintiff or 
defendant will increase the chance that the action goes to 
trial. This observation is consistent with the effect of 
framing on both buyer-seller negotiation (Neale, Huber & 
Northcraft, 1987) and managerial negotiation (McCusker & 
Carnvale, 1995).  
The ability to resolve disputes through manipulation of 
frame depends crucially on the relative importance of 
framing and legal role in determining the decision to 
settle. It is possible that although framing effects may 
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 occur, as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
they are minor compared to the effects of legal role. In 
this case, the capacity to intervene in disputes using this 
strategy would be limited. On the other hand, it is also 
conceivable that there are little or no intrinsic differences 
in legal role in their effects of the decision to settle and 
that framing effects dominate. In this case, the 
opportunity to alter the outcome of negotiations through 
re-framing presents itself.  
 
The present study 
The aim of the present study is to examine the effects of 
frame and legal role on the decision to reach an out-of-court 
settlement in a legal dispute. Participants received a 
questionnaire containing four different legal scenarios, each 
of which dealt with a civil dispute for a sum of $20,000. 
Although the facts concerning each scenario remained the 
same, each could be presented in one of four forms that 
factorially combined legal role, plaintiff vs. defendant, and 
frame, positive vs. negative. For plaintiffs, positively framed 
scenarios described potential outcomes in terms of gains 
relative to the current situation following the initial loss of 
income. Thus, a positively framed plaintiff could either gain 
$20,000 in or gain nothing, depending on the outcome of 
the trial. Negatively framed scenarios, on the other hand, 
described potential outcomes in terms of losses relative to 
the situation they would have obtained had the initial loss of 
income not occurred. For a negatively framed plaintiff, this 
meant that they could either lose $20,000 or lose nothing at 
trial. Conversely, for defendants, negatively framed 
scenarios described potential outcomes in terms of losses 
relative to the current situation following an initial increase 
in income. Positively framed scenarios described potential 
outcomes in terms of gains relative the situation that would 
have obtained had the initial increase in income not 
occurred. In each scenario, participants were told that a 
single settlement offer of $10,000 was on the table. If this 
was rejected and the case went to trial then they had a 50% 
chance of either being awarded or having to pay the entire 
sum of $20,000 and a 50% chance of being awarded or 
having to pay nothing. Participants read each scenario in 
turn and were asked if they would accept or reject the 
settlement offer. Also, following the results of a pilot study, 
participants were asked to indicate what they believed their 
(subjective) chance of winning in court was, regardless of 
the lawyer’s (objective) advice. We expected to find an 
effect of both role and frame on the decision to settle 
although the relative sizes of these effects and whether or 




The participants in this study were 193 psychology students 
from the University of Adelaide who received course credit 
for their participation. They were aged between 16 and 39 
(M = 19.6, SD = 4.03) and were randomly assigned to one 
of four groups. 
Materials 
Participants completed a questionnaire consisting of four 
legal scenarios. Each scenario was presented in one of four 
test conditions defined by the factorial combination of role 
(plaintiff or defendant) and frame (positive or negative). 
Each scenario could be presented to participants either as a 
positively framed plaintiff (P+), a negatively framed 
plaintiff (P-), a positively framed defendant (D+) or a 
negatively framed defendant (D-). Thus, each participant 
was under each condition once, and saw each factual 
scenario once. The assignment of scenarios to each 
role/frame combination was counterbalanced across four 
different versions of the questionnaire. In each version, the 
four scenarios were always presented in the same order, 
but the order in which the conditions were presented was 
counterbalanced. 
Each scenario outlined the facts of a legal dispute which 
could plausibly be presented in both positive and negative 
frames for both the plaintiff and the defendant. The first 
scenario involved a defamation claim between a shop 
owner and a newspaper. The second scenario outlined a 
property dispute between an investor and a bed-and-
breakfast operator. The third scenario was a contractual 
dispute between two business partners regarding 
entitlement to income. The fourth scenario described an 
inheritance dispute between two cousins. In each case, it 
was stated that the plaintiff was suing the defendant for 
$20,000, that the chance of winning at trial was 50%. If 
the plaintiff won at trial then the defendant would have to 
pay the full $20,000 to them, alternatively, if the plaintiff 
lost at trial then the defendant would have to pay them 
nothing. For simplicity, there were no legal costs 
associated with the case. Each participant was told that a 
settlement offer of $10,000 had been made and they were 
asked if they would be prepared to accept it in order to 
avoid a trial. Participants were also asked the following 
question after each scenario in order to obtain an 
indication of the subjective chance of winning: 
‘Your lawyer has advised that you have a 50% chance of 
winning in court. Based on the details provided, what 
chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of 
winning in court?’  
Each scenario established the relevant legal role by 
means of an initial statement of the form: ‘You are the 
plaintiff/defendant in a litigation suit…’ The relevant 
frame was established through alternative wording of the 
trial outcomes and the offer. For example, in the first 
scenario, the trial outcome in the positively framed 
plaintiff condition is described as follows, 
“Your lawyer has estimated that you have a 50% chance 
that the judge will rule in your favor and your will receive 
$20,000 in compensation and a 50% chance that the judge 
will rule against you and you will receive nothing in 
compensation” 
Similarly, the settlement offer in this condition is 
described in the following way, 
“If you accept this offer, you will receive $10,000 in 
compensation” 
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 In the condition of a negatively framed defendant, the 
phrase, “receive … in compensation”, was replaced by 
the phrase “pay … in compensation”. For the negatively 
framed plaintiff, this phrase was replaced by the phrase, 
“lose … in income”, while for the positively framed 
defendant, it was replaced by the phrase, “keep … in new 
income”.  
 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were allocated to one of four groups 
corresponding to the version of the questionnaire they 
received. They were asked to read through and to respond 
to all four scenarios in the order in which they were 
presented. They were instructed to consider each scenario 
separately and to make their decision solely on the basis 
of the details provided, without regard to legal fees or 
court costs. They were also asked not to view the 
scenarios as moral dilemmas, as both plaintiffs and 
defendants would feel that their position was correct.  
 
Results 
Due to space constraints, the reporting of these results is 
necessarily brief. In order to determine whether the 
framing manipulations were successful, the data were 
analyzed using logistic regression to determine the main 
effects of role, frame and their interaction, with 
subjective beliefs about the probability of winning 
included as a covariate (see figure 1). An overall 
analysis, collapsed across all scenarios, showed 
subjective chance of winning to be highly significant (p < 
.001) and the biggest predictor of settlement. The 
analysis further revealed a highly significant framing 
effect (p < .001), with positively framed litigants 
approximately 21% more likely to settle than their 
negatively framed counterparts, regardless of role. 
Importantly, the effect of role was not significant (p > 
.05), nor was there an interaction between role and frame. 
This suggests that role and frame are distinct constructs, 
and it is frame that more strongly influences people’s 
decisions. 
An examination of individual scenarios revealed a 
similar pattern to the overall analysis, with litigants in a 
positive frame consistently more likely to settle than 
those in a negative frame. Subjective chance of winning 
remained highly significant in all scenarios. The effect of 
frame was significant (p < .05) in three of the four 
scenarios, while role was significant in only one instance 
(Scenario 3). As with the overall analysis, there was no 




This experiment revealed three main results. First, the 
decision to settle a simulated legal dispute is strongly 
influenced by frame. In three of the four scenarios, a 
litigant in a positive frame was more likely to accept the 
settlement offer than a litigant in a negative frame. This 
effect is consistent with prospect theory, as proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). When induced to be in a 
positive frame and thereby choosing between gains, 
participants in this study were consistently risk averse – 
they were more likely to accept the settlement offer with 
its certain outcome and less likely to go to trial with its 
uncertain outcome. Conversely, negatively framed 
participants, choosing between losses, were more risk 
taking – they were less likely to accept the settlement offer 
and more likely to go to trial. The second finding was that 
the effect of frame was independent of any effect of legal 
role as none of the interaction terms approached 
significance. This further supports the view that role and 
frame should be viewed as very different constructs.  
The third main result is that the effect of legal role on the 
decision to settle was inconsistent across scenarios. This 
suggests that once the influence of frame has been 
controlled, there is little or no difference between plaintiffs 
and defendants in their propensity to settle. This 
contradicts previous claims that plaintiffs will always be 
more risk averse and thus more likely to settle (e.g., 
Rachlinski, 1996; van Koppen, 1990). In fact, the results 
for Scenarios 2 and 3 in the present study show that it is 
possible, under some circumstances, for plaintiffs to be 
less likely to settle than defendants, independent of how 
they frame the dispute. This last result, in conjunction with 
the variable effect of role across the other scenarios, was 
unexpected.  
 
Modelling the Effects of Role, Frame and 
Perceived Chance of Winning 
By constructing a simple model based on prospect theory, 
it is possible to combine the results of this experiment in a 
single graph that demonstrates the effects of role, frame, 
and perceived chance of winning on the probability of 
accepting the settlement offer. In order to do this, we first 
note that according to prospect theory, the settlement offer 
will be accepted if its perceived value is greater than the 
perceived expected value of going to trial. An individual in 
a positive frame, whether plaintiff or defendant, should 
settle if,  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 . $10,000 . $20,000 1 . $0w v w p v w p v> + −  
where v(.) is a subjective value function that takes a 
quantity (money in this case) as its argument, and w(.) is a 
weighting function applied to the subjective probability of 
winning at trial, p. According to Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), people tend to assign greater weight or importance 
to probabilities close to zero and relatively less importance 
to probabilities close to one. A similar equation can be 
written for an individual in a negative frame. In this case, 
such an individual should settle if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 . $10, 000 . $0 1 . $20, 000w v w p v w p v− > − + − −  
In other words, they will settle if the perceived value of the 
settlement offer is greater than the expected value of going 
to trial. This, in turn is determined by the subjective value 
of winning at trial, and losing nothing, and the subjective 
value of losing at trial and losing the full amount. 
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 In the present study, the objective values of the 
settlement offer, $10,000, and the award, $20,000, were 
both fixed. According to prospect theory, the subjective 
values of these quantities are therefore also fixed for a 
given individual. We assume that the respective values are 
also fixed across individuals for a given role, frame, and 
scenario. This means that, after re-arranging the terms in 
the above equations1, for an individual in a positive frame, 
the settlement offer will be accepted whenever,   








while for an individual in a negative frame, the offer will 
be accepted whenever, 







−− > =−  
 
When modelling these data, it is important to note that 
the average subjective probability of winning varied 
between scenarios. The effect, however, appears to be 
consistent across conditions, with participants exhibiting a 
high level of agreement regarding the chances of winning. 
For example, in Scenario 1, all four conditions believed, 
on average, that the plaintiff had a 60% chance of winning 
in court. Conversely, in Scenario 3, all conditions believed 
it was the defendant who had a 60% chance of winning. 
With this in mind, we assume that within each such 
condition, subjective probability is approximately normally 
distributed with a mean and standard deviation 
corresponding to the observed mean and standard deviation 
for that condition. We also assume, as a first 
approximation2, that w(p) = p. Let mi and si be the mean and 
standard deviation of the subjective probability of winning 
at trial for condition i. Let Pi be the probability of accepting 
the settlement offer in condition i, and let Φ(.) be the normal 
cumulative distribution function. Then, for participants in a 
positive frame, Pi = Φ((r+ − mi)/si), while for participants in 
a negative frame, Pi = Φ((1 − r- − mi)/si). 
Figure 1 presents the observed probability of accepting 
the settlement offer as a function of the subjective 
probability of winning at trial for each combination of 
role, frame, and scenario. The figure also shows the 
predicted functions for the best-fitting values of r+ and r-. 
These values were found to be 0.60 and 0.48, respectively, 
and may be interpreted as the relative value of a gain or 
loss of $10,000 compared to a similar gain or loss of 
$20,000. The best fitting values that we obtained indicate 
that for this sample of participants and conditions, a gain 
of $10,000 is perceived as equivalent to 60% of a gain of 
$20,000 while a loss of $10,000 is perceived as equivalent 
to 48% of a loss of $20,000. These values are consistent 
with prospect theory which proposes that the subjective 
value function is negatively accelerating 
                                                          
1 The null term in each equation falls out since, according to 
prospect theory, v(0) = 0. We also assume that w(1) = 1.  





















Figure 1: The probability of settling as function of the 
probability of winning across scenario, frame, and role. 
 
for gains and positively accelerating and steeper for losses. 
Accordingly, the ratio for gains, r+, is both greater than 0.5, 
indicating a negatively accelerating function, and greater 
than the ratio for losses, r-, indicating a steeper function for 
the latter.  
Figure 1 also illustrates two main effects. First, there is a 
general trend for participants to become more risk taking as 
their subjective probability of winning increases. This 
agrees with both prospect theory and commonsense - if you 
think you are going to win at trial then, if you are the 
defendant, you are more likely to offer a relatively lower 
sum to settle and, if you are the plaintiff, you are more 
likely to demand a relatively greater sum to settle. However, 
these results directly contradict the conclusion reached by 
van Koppen (1990) that litigants become less risk taking as 
their subjective probability of winning increases. In fact, the 
conclusion reached by van Koppen appears to misconstrue 
the concept of framing. Framing is a process whereby 
individuals evaluate outcomes in terms of gains and losses 
from a given reference point and is conceptually distinct 
from the expected probability of a particular outcome. Thus, 
according to prospect theory, every outcome, regardless of 
its probability of occurrence, can be presented in both a 
positive and a negative frame. For example, a plaintiff in a 
negative frame will feel that they are owed $20,000 and will 
still consider anything less than this sum to be a loss, 
regardless of their expectation of the money’s recovery. To 
assume, as Van Koppen does, that frame is contingent upon 
an outcome’s probability is analogous to suggesting that if 
you lose $20 from your wallet, you would consider it a loss 
only if you expected to find it again (or alternatively, that 
you would actually consider it a gain if you recovered it).  
Figure 1 also demonstrates the effect of frame. Although 
the data tend to be more consistent for positively framed 
conditions than for negatively framed conditions, overall, 
for a given subjective probability of winning, individuals in 
a positive frame are more likely to settle than individuals in 
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 a negative frame. The effect is greatest for probabilities 
around 0.5, and the average difference is about 10%.  
Finally, Figure 1 also demonstrates the lack of an effect. 
Overall, there is little or no evidence of a systematic effect 
of legal role. However, it should be noted that there is at 
least one anomalous data point corresponding to the 
negatively framed defendant (D-) in scenario 4. Although in 
a negative frame, participants in this condition agreed to 
settle at a rate that would be expected if they were in a 




The principal result of the present study is that the 
likelihood of accepting an offer to settle out of court can be 
shaped by two factors; the frame or reference point under 
which the offer is evaluated, and the subjective probability 
of winning at trial. Critically, this result is inconsistent with 
the view that plaintiffs are risk-averse and defendants are 
risk-seeking (van Koppen, 1990). Instead, the present study 
showed that both plaintiffs and defendants are equally 
susceptible to framing manipulations.  
The study also suggests that – at least when evaluating 
hypothetical situations – there is no self-serving bias 
influencing people’s expectations. That is, while it is 
unclear what really does cause participants to disagree with 
the lawyer’s assessment of the outcome probability, it is 
unlikely to be due to a role effect. Indeed, it seems more 
likely that the divergence is a function of the participants’ 
own assessment of the factual scenarios used, rather than a 
systematic effect of role. This study therefore rejects the 
assumption that role necessarily determines a litigants’ risk 
preferences and subjective assessments. In particular, it 
appears that risk preferences are determined by framing, and 
that it may be possible to arbitrarily manipulate frame for 
both plaintiffs and defendants.  
From an applied perspective, these results suggest that re-
framing may be a useful tactic in negotiations to increase 
the chance of reaching a settlement. That said, the study did 
not manipulate this directly. Rather, individuals were asked 
to assume the role of either plaintiff or defendant and to 
evaluate a fixed settlement offer. An obvious extension of 
the present study would be to pair plaintiffs and defendants 
in different frames. As discussed earlier, prospect theory 
predicts a set of ordered outcomes for pairs of litigants in 
different frames.  
We were able to manipulate frame relatively easily in the 
present study as the participants were all involved in 
simulated legal disputes. It is unclear how successful it 
would be to manipulate frame in the real disputes. Further 
research is required to determine the extent to which actual 
litigants adopt variable reference points in their evaluations, 
the extent to which these are fixed or are labile throughout 
negotiations, and how easily they may be influenced by 
third parties, such as lawyers. 
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